A wicked left hook
A reader named bob commented on a previous post:
Simply asserting that rights are moral concepts does not make them so, otherwise I could assert anything.
This followed on an argument about whether “I have a right” could imply an “ought”, such as, “you ought to respect my right.”
My point was that it is one thing to say, “I have a right to free speech,” and another to say, “I have a wicked left hook.” Both are assertions of fact. But the first is a moral assertion whereas the second is merely descriptive. This is because (as I stated in my reply to bob) “right” is itself a moral concept: like justice, or love, or honor, the term itself contains “ought” as well as “is.”
Now, I think bob took me to be saying that “right” is a morally good or valid concept. So he gives the following examples:
By declaring “rights” as inherently moral, just because we define them as such, we open the door to use that language to justify anything. I have the right to eat ice cream. I have the right to drink beer.
I had no intention of playing either Tweedle-dum or Tweedle-dee. Rather, I meant that by using the language of rights, we automatically involve judgments about obligations and relationships between persons, because such judgments are contained in the definition of “right”.
That doesn’t mean we have to assent to every claim of a right. It only means we need to take it seriously as a moral claim, and judge whether the claim is true or not.
Natural rights and civil rights
Now, I take it for granted that we can all agree about civil rights. Civil rights are rights granted by the State, such as the right to vote or the right to remain silent. These rights can be revoked. They may be limited to a certain group of people such as, citizens, or adults over the age of 18, and so on. The question of whether so-and-so has a civil right to such-and-such can be determined in a court of law.
What bob calls into question is whether there are (or can be) natural rights, also known as “rights of Man” or “human rights.”
It’s a good question. In my previous post, I stated that a right is sort of the flip side of a duty. If you have a duty toward me, then I have a right to what is due me. If I have a right, then someone has a duty to respect that right. So, even though I think there’s far too much talk these days about rights, and far too little about duty, I’m willing to fight for the reality of rights. If there are no such things as rights, then it seems to me that there are likewise no such things as duties.
Now, a natural right (or a natural duty) is one that follows from nature. That is, the basis and foundation of these rights (and duties) is my human nature.
But a right is a kind of ownership of something, and a duty is a kind of debt. Both are kinds of relationships to other people. They do not exist in an isolated individual, but they necessarily exist in a community. You cannot interact with other people for very long without agreeing about who may or may not do this or use that.
So, the question is, is human nature essentially communal or individual? Are we meant to live together in mutual support, or are we independent and therefore competitive when we encounter one another.
That’s a critically important question, but I’ll leave it for another post.
-
[...] Law by Robert Jun 20 2010 TrackBack Address. Jeana left a wonderfully provocative comment on an earlier post. I began to reply in the comments, but I realized that this merited its own post, so here’s a [...]
Hmm…it looks like Bob might be prone to being a “definition changer”. Are you losing an argument? Change the definition!
More seriously, I’ve seen this type of arguement over and over. (This is Clinton’s “What does “the” mean?) He is correct (as opposed to right *grin*) about the general nature of language. Any word can mean anything we want it to mean.
However, to have a cohesive discussion you have to agree on terms. If you can’t do that(or some cases won’t) then in my mind there’s a whole lot of wasted time. Without a common framework, there’s no way to have a constructive conversation. And by extension there’s also no way to “lose” such a discussion.
In my experience, some people who habitually resort to changing the definitions appear to be extremely uncomfortable with the idea that they may ever be wrong. Disagreeing on definitions (or pointing out the arbitrary nature of language) is a way to escape a discussion that is not trending in way that fits their comfort zone. (AKA Clinton’s “the” issue)
Anyway – glad to see a post! I was wondering what was up!!
I’m the definition changer? Far from it. I really dislike “definitional” arguments, which is why I didn’t introduce it — Robert did!
If you go back and follow the original thread, I posed the question as to how Robert justified the concept of natural rights. It was Robert who shifted the goal posts away from this to the question of whether rights are inherently moral by invoking the definitional argument. I responded to that one before I tried to shift the conversation back to the original question.
I’m really not trying to be snarky. I’m also reading the book, and I’m genuinely interested in the debate about natural rights.
I’ve already stipulated that I agree with you that, if we wanted, we could say that rights are inherently moral because that’s the way we have defined them in our language.
But, to repeat my last question: how does this demonstrate that rights are natural? We can use language to define all sorts of abstract concepts, but on what basis should we believe that our definitions of these construct are “natural” or “real”?
And, yes, you are right that I took you to implying that rights are a “valid” concept. If you are going to argue that they are not a valid concept, then on what basis should we continue to use them at all? On what basis can we tell somebody that they have a “duty” to me, if rights are not valid?
You say: That doesn’t mean we have to assent to every claim of a right. It only means we need to take it seriously as a moral claim, and judge whether the claim is true or not
But on what basis can we make this judgement? Which “rights” are natural and which are not?
To answer this you seem to again go for the definitional argument:
“Now, a natural right (or a natural duty) is one that follows from nature. That is, the basis and foundation of these rights (and duties) is my human nature.”
But what does that mean? It is circular. It is equivalent to saying: rights are natural because they are part of human nature? This doesn’t tell us anything about which rights are natural and which aren’t, or whether natural rights even exist. Again, just because we can define something, doesn’t mean that it is natural as opposed to a cultural category. And, Amy, just because we can all agree on the definition, doesn’t mean that it is a “natural” category as opposed to a cultural category. This isn’t to point out the arbitrary nature of language, it is simply an appeal for some external standard against which to judge the existence of natural rights.
Is it really “just pointing out the arbitrary nature of language” to ask whether a sufficient proof of natural rights is simply to assert: “Natural rights exist because some rights are inherently natural”?
Oops – looks like I hit to nerve. Sorry about that.
I have to admit that I’m sticking by my premise that the conversation is almost completely about attempting to define “natural rights”. I understand being insulted (sorry about that!) but I for one, have either little time or patience for nit-picking away at terms in an endless argument.
What makes a right natural? Well, actually, I don’t really know. I think that there is a supreme being/force and what truely differentiates us from other animals is a conscience and the ability to act on it. I am not given a free pass to act regardless of the consequences. Likewise I have the right to expect the same from others. (Thus we come back to Rob’s duty/rights are two sides of the same coin.)
If you don’t believe that, if you don’t have that kind of faith, if you’re experience is different, you know what — that’s totally okay.
It doesn’t make you more or less smarter than me. It just makes you different. Heck, my belief system has to allow you that right, ironically.
And there ends the discussion, really. 2 paragraphs – we’ve agreed to disagree. (Or at least I have. *grin*) Sometimes concepts are completely about faith — life doesn’t present rational reasons for everything.
And that, Amy, is why you’ll never be a really real philosopher.
If only you’d spend more time thinking and talking about virtue, instead of actually acting virtuously, then… um … you’d be ever so much more philosophical!
And isn’t that everyone’s goal?
@Amy – I’ve been up to a variety of things that have kept me away from my beloved computer. But, rapture and bliss, we are once again reunited!
I’m not sure bob is a definition changer so much as a definition demander. If I understand him properly, he simply didn’t accept my proposed definitions as correct or plausible, and demanded that I provide a better one.
That said, you’re right that we have to be willing to speak the same language if we’re going to have a rational argument.
@bob – I never intended to veer away from the question of how to determine whether there are natural rights. I simply thought we needed to lay some foundations first.
That’s really what this post is about. It’s true that I haven’t laid out an argument for natural rights: I’ve merely defined them. That is, if there is any such thing as a “natural right”, it is a right that is founded on nature, rather than on law.
Then, I pointed out that the part of nature it would have to be founded on is the rational and relational part of human nature.
But that’s an awfully big topic, and I’m hoping to write a post about it sometime this weekend. Till then, I hope you’ll be patient with me.
I’m definitely willing to be patient.
Just one correction: I have no problem with your definition of natural rights, and I haven’t ever demanded an alternative definition (although I wouldn’t mind that you try to be somewhat more specific so that I can recognize a natural right when I see one) — I’m just not willing to accept that definition, in and of itself, as a sufficient demonstration of the existence of natural rights.
Looking forward to your next post.
Very interesting, Robert and Bob. It would be very hard to make a convincing argument for or against “natural rights” that would be clear enough to “recognize a natural right when I see one.” Perhaps a start would be the argument that there is a natural order to the world, and things work better when we cooperate with it. Plants die without life. Cows were made to eat grass. We live longer if we exercise and eat our veggies than if we sit in front of the TV and eat cookies all day every day. Men’s and women’s bodies each operate in ways that the other cannot.
If you were able to argue that following the natural order is a moral obligation, you could argue that because people’s bodies function better (which would need to be defined) if they have had food, they have a right to food, and all the other “natural rights” would operate on similar lines, but there’s so much more encompassed in the natural order than these individual rights. I believe that the natural order is definitely the best way of living life, that it is seeking out the way God designed the world to be and cooperating with His magnificent creation, and I think that everyone should cooperate with nature in this way, but part of that is allowing people to make the free choice for themselves, which means that they may choose not to cooperate, to live independently and competitively instead. In this way, I would see following the natural order (seeking the highest good) as a moral imperative, and I could agree that we would have “natural rights” to have access to this highest good.
The difficulty comes in the intersection of natural and civil rights. It’s really difficult to define natural rights in civil terms. It may be immoral for me to sit on the couch all day, watching TV and eating cookies, but how can you demand that I be more productive? And I certainly wouldn’t support any government establishing laws that would prohibit me from doing so, and how would they make me change? Put me in a jail cell to sit around all day? If I were following the natural order of creation, I would be productive with the gifts God has given me, and it is my natural right to do so, but it is my civil right to sit around all day. Some “natural rights” just cannot be turned into civil rights.
Our moral obligation also becomes more difficult to discern in an imperfect world, without everyone following completely the natural order of the world. It becomes a trickier moral question of what to do with the person who can provide for himself but chooses not to. What do we do when all of us are sinners? How do you work for the natural order and natural rights when not all of the natural order is in place? I don’t have enough food to feed the hungry, and it would be wrong for me to take yours away to do so.