Third Edition
My most meticulous fans/stalkers will have noticed that I’ve (finally) updated my Reading List page. I’m in the middle of After Virtue, by Alasdair MacIntyre. And fairly early on, Prof. MacIntyre makes the stunning claim that he doesn’t think human rights are real.
Here’s what he actually says:
[T]he truth is plain: there are no such rights, [i.e., human rights, natural rights, rights of man,] and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed. (p. 69, emphasis in the original.)
He then claims that modern attempts to explain or demonstrate or justify “rights” essentially contradicts itself.
What’s a right?
It’s difficult to argue with Prof. MacIntyre here because, while he gives a decent history of the term “human rights,” he doesn’t give much in the way of a definition of it. He focuses on explaining the universality of “rights.” Nor does he give much of an argument against them; he merely states that other attempts have failed.
Now, he might have gone into greater depth elsewhere, maybe even elsewhere in this book – I’m only about halfway through. But if I had made such a bold statement, I would have devoted a page or three to fleshing out my argument.
I think that the idea of “rights” is so important to our society these days that it’s worth thinking about a bit. I used to be of Prof. MacIntyre’s mind on the subject, that “rights” are a fiction, a myth. But I’ve read and thought and experienced a great deal since then, and I’m now firmly of the opinion that “rights” are indeed a real moral category, even if the way we think or talk about them leaves much to be desired.
So, here is my own definition of “rights”: a right is the flip-side of a duty. To claim a right is to claim that something belongs to me; that if I do not have it, then it is owed to me; and that it is owed to me by society in general and by any member of society who happens to be there at a given time.
In other words, if I have a right, then you have a duty toward me.
What Prof. MacIntyre gets right about rights
Now, Prof. MacIntyre notes a number of negative effects on society that arise from the focus on rights that has grown since the Enlightenment. For example, a focus on rights tends to isolate individuals, and presumes an adversarial relationship between individuals. It encourages selfish and self-centered thinking. It neglects the bonds and relationships I have with other people.
But all that’s needed is to say, “Hey, let’s not focus so much on rights!” Perhaps, “Let’s keep rights in perspective,” or, “We need to rediscover the dignity and respect we owe one another, rather than competing against each other.”
Granted, that’s an uphill battle. Our culture has discarded almost any kind of universal moral claim except “human rights.” But that doesn’t mean that those other claims don’t exist, any more than “rights” didn’t exist before the terminology was developed. Rather, it means that we have to learn (or re-learn) how to think and talk about them.
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[...] Posted in Duty, Reality, Rights by Robert Jun 17 2010 TrackBack Address. A reader named bob commented on a previous post: Simply asserting that rights are moral concepts does not make them so, [...]
I think that one of the difficulties in understanding rights is the balance between rights and duties. I think most people focus on the rights that they have without wanting any responsibility. “Society” can’t just feed everyone and clothe everyone and give everyone basic medical care and all the other “human rights” if everyone is sitting there, waiting for it to come while not working for it themselves. The early Christians discovered this problem and were commanded by Paul that if someone doesn’t work, he won’t eat (1 Thess 3:10.) How do you reconcile this with your understanding of rights? Should they be unconditional?
Sorry, typo…. 2 Thess. 3:10
I’m impressed that you kept going. If there is ever a sink into moral relativism, it is to claim there’s no such thing as rights, which is just this side of claiming there’s no such thing as moral behavior.
I will grant you that that rights are a human construction, but without them, what’s the point of building societies? It is not our tool building that separates from the animals, it’s that ability to make the judgment of a “right” and a wrong.
I also agree with you strongly that a right also creates a duty. Part of the reason I can’t go hog wild on the idea that health care is a “right” is because by definition it creates a duty for all the current players who provide it. We don’t say farmers have a duty to feed people for free or profit. I would consider food to be a far more fundamental than what are be periodic services for most people.
Jeana – seems to me that a right is sometimes prior in time to a duty, but the duty is prior logically. For example: a child has a right to be cared for and educated, and this comes earlier in time than his/her duty to contribute to society based on that education. However, the reason that the child has a right to education is because he/she has a duty to participate in society. So the duty comes first logically, but the right comes first in terms of time.
That means that giving someone an education (or anything else) cannot depend on what they will do with that education in the future. We can demand that they use it well, that they work for their food once they’re able to – but we can’t withhold their education based on the possibility that they’ll become overeducated slackers like me. So, in that sense, yes I’d say that rights are unconditional.
As for 2 Thessalonians, I have a hard time seeing St. Paul intending that as a universal absolute. Seems to me he’s talking about taking advantage of the generosity of others. Indeed, a couple verses before, he notes that he himself had a “right” (RSV) to eat without working, based on his status as an apostle. But his main point is to encourage people to remember their duties: “Brethren, do not be weary in well-doing.”
Philosophically, I agree with you. I’m just still trying to figure out the practical application. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need” is a really nice idea, but making it really happen in any sort of larger society or the world has failed miserably historically, decreasing the overall standard of living. In Paul’s case, was it his “status” as an apostle or his “work” as an apostle that gave him the right to eat? I just don’t see Paul as a freeloader. He was doing good work that was important to the well-being of the community.
I think that talk of material rights often acts as if some people are blessed with bread and band-aids growing in their yards and some people are not, and if the people who have would just share with the people who don’t, there would be enough to go around. The truth is that it takes work to create food and health care, and it’s not so easy figuring out what duties we actually have. The truth is that if enough people do not work to produce food and to provide health care, there won’t be enough to go around.
You bring up an interesting point as far as children are concerned. Certainly, rights given to a child such as food and education need to be unconditional (as much as possible) at least until they are capable of working, but even children have certain duties based on their abilities, though it would be immoral to withhold food if they fail to perform their duties.
Adults, though, may be a different story. I do have a hard time feeling it is right to refuse food to someone who is hungry, but what about the adult who has been given food and education as a child, who is capable of work yet chooses to play video games all day before knocking on my door and asking for another meal. Certainly, he is remiss in his duties by freeloading. Am I remiss in my duties if I turn him away? Or does letting him go hungry for one night encourage him to take some more responsibility, thus freeing him from the deadly sin of sloth? What if he starves before he learns his lesson? Do I have a duty to give him food, regardless of his fulfillment of his duties? Do I have a duty to demand that he fulfill his duties by making his right to food conditional on his duty to work for it?
I feel like Paul is saying that we should demand that people perform their duties, and that it is OK and even good to make things that should be natural human rights conditional on such duties in cases where freeloading occurs (not participating in a vocation that benefits the community, but not the food supply, such as Paul’s preaching). Though, it’s not a hard and fast rule. There is room for mercy and charity. I think it would be reasonable to allow the freeloader to go hungry a few nights in order to encourage him to take responsibility himself, but he probably has a right to enough food to keep him alive.
Amy – Well, MacIntyre is definitely not promoting moral relativism. In fact, I think he’d take your statement that rights are a human construction as more indicative of moral relativism.
I’d make a distinction between “natural rights” and “civil/legal rights”. Natural rights are based on our human nature, and are absolutely universal. Every human society is morally bound to respect them. They are an aspect of Justice with a big J. We discover them, rather than construct them.
Civil rights are based on the particular laws of a particular human society. Ideally, they are based on natural rights. Civil rights specify how the natural rights are respected in this time and place. These are definitely a human construction.
So, participation in society is a natural right; voting is a civil right.
At least, that’s how I figure it.
So, then, what is your basis for concluding that natural rights exist? Just because you say so?
MacIntyre is absolutely correct. Despite centuries of trying, no good argument exists for believing “rights” are anything other than arbitrary human constructions that differ from place to place and throughout history.
Just saying that we should define “rights” as “duties” doesn’t make them any less arbitrary or any more natural.
Sorry if that came off as snarky — it wasn’t meant to be.
I’m actually about 3/4 of the way through “Beyond Virtue” myself, so I’m genuinely interested in your answer.
Despite quite a bit of searching, I’m with Bentham, Hume and Kant, that there are no objective grounds on which to justify the concept of natural rights.
Your statement:
“if I have a right, then you have a duty toward me.”
falls right into Hume’s is/ought problem. You can’t move logically from a declarative statement (I have a right) to an evaluative statement (so you ought to treat me a certain way – you have a duty toward me).
Why should we believe you when you say that you have a right? On what basis do you assert this right?
Similarly, your later statement: “Natural rights are based on our human nature, and are absolutely universal. Every human society is morally bound to respect them. They are an aspect of Justice with a big J. We discover them, rather than construct them.”
On what do you base this? Simply to assert that natural rights are based on our human nature is begging the question. It is presupposing something (“human nature is the foundation of rights”) in its premise (“we have natural rights”). Again, it does not give anyone any reason to suppose that you are correct that you have natural rights.
Thoughts?
@bob:
You can’t move logically from a declarative statement (I have a right) to an evaluative statement (so you ought to treat me a certain way – you have a duty toward me).
Except that “I have a right” declares something more than a mere fact, like “I have a rock” does. A rock is a mere object. A right is a moral concept, and it contains an “ought” within it. Otherwise a right is utterly meaningless.
Despite quite a bit of searching, I’m with Bentham, Hume and Kant, that there are no objective grounds on which to justify the concept of natural rights.
My question is, what do you mean by “objective”?
I would argue that human nature is objective, including the relational and moral aspects of our nature. I would also argue that various cultures at various times of history have been more aware or less so of different aspects of our very complex nature.
But this requires a very different kind of certitude than, for example, empirical certitude. The Thomistic tradition calls it “moral certitude,” and it is the kind of certitude one has that, for example, one’s friend will be trustworthy with a secret.
I really ought to write up a post on this topic. I’ve been giving it a great deal of thought, but haven’t had the time or energy to pull it all together. So please forgive this very incomplete response. More is coming.
“Except that “I have a right” declares something more than a mere fact, like “I have a rock” does. A rock is a mere object. A right is a moral concept, and it contains an “ought” within it. Otherwise a right is utterly meaningless.”
Why does it declare more than a “mere fact”? Again, your answer begs the question. You are presupposing your conclusions (“a right is a moral concept”) in your premise (“rights contain an “ought” within it”). It is a circular argument that doesn’t follow. Simply asserting that rights are moral concepts does not make them so, otherwise I could assert anything. I can assert that eating ice cream is a moral concept, but does that make it so? I can assert that access to ice cream is a moral right, does that make it so? Humans have invented all sorts of abstract concepts (e.g., The American Dream), but does that make them real or natural?
By objective I mean exactly what most people mean — a standard or perspective outside of myself against which to judge something. “Human nature” is a fine standard against which to judge, if you can demonstrate it. But can you really demonstrate that “rights” are part of human nature? How then to explain the extraordinary diversity of rights conceptions both cross-culturally and historically? You seem to make the argument that some people at some times have lived “contrary to nature”? And if so: how do you decide which culture’s conception of rights is “natural” and which is not? You, again, will need another standard against which to judge this problem.
All cultures can and do claim “moral certitude” — how do we know whose certitude is “natural” and whose is “unnatural”?
I take a right to be a moral concept, containing an “ought” within it, from its definition. If I say, “I have a right to vote,” that means that it is unjust to deny me the ability to vote, or that the ability to vote must be provided for me. If I say, “I have a ballot,” all that means is that I have a certain piece of paper in my hand.
The very language of “rights” presupposes morality and “oughts”, as far as I understand it. How would you define “right” in such a way that it does not have an inherent moral meaning?
There are two problems with accepting your “definitional” argument:
First, as I’ve pointed out, it begs the question. You cannot presuppose conclusions from premises. It is logically equivalent to saying, “Rights are moral because, by definition, rights are moral.” That is logically sound, but it doesn’t tell us very much about whether rights are natural or about what types of things we should and should not consider to be rights.
By declaring “rights” as inherently moral, just because we define them as such, we open the door to use that language to justify anything. I have the right to eat ice cream. I have the right to drink beer.
Presumably you would agree that if someone were to say, “I have the right to sit around all day and receive welfare”, this shouldn’t bind the rest of us to accept that “right”.
And yet, if you are correct that it is simply the language of “rights” that gives them authority, that we require no other external (i.e., objective) criteria, then on what basis can we deny some peoples’ claims to rights and accept others?
And this is the second problem with your definitional argument of rights as inherently moral. As noted above, it has sidetracked us from discussing whether rights are natural, which is where we started.
We could agree, I think, that rights are inherently moral because that is the way rights are defined, but how does this demonstrate that rights are natural? We can use language to define all sorts of abstract concepts, but on what basis should we believe that our definitions of these construct are “natural” or “real”?
Hi,
Just finished the book. What a read. Yes, this question about right made a deep impression on me also among others.
No, Prof MacIntyre gave no fleshing out elsewhere in the book. I don’t know if there are other books of his about it.
The automatic question that formed in my head when he argued this way is, “How do you then explain morality and immorality without a notion of rights?”
Say murder, moderns would usually say that everyone has a right to life so that no one ought to murder anyone. I think Prof MacIntyre would argue thus: murder is wrong because it does not promote any virtue, specifically defined in the book. It leads to no conception of a good that can be shared by a community with developed practices and within a narrative tradition.
I think that such an explanation could be duplicated and would prove to be more satisfying for many moral problems. I have personally witnessed how people have created so many rights, some even absurd: right to be free from proselytism, right to reproductive health, right to informed choice, (and in my university) right to a hangout. That was how I started questioning the whole notion of rights. Then I read After Virtue. Haha.